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Essays on the Changing Labor Market: 
Computerization, Inequality, and the Development 
of the Contingent Work Force 
David H. Autor 
The essays in this dissertation explore the causes and 
consequences of three prominent U.S. labor market 
developments of the 1980s and 1990s: the rapid advent 
of workplace computerization, the historic rise in 
earnings inequality, and the unprecedented growth of 
temporary help supply employment (THS). 
1. COMPUTING INEQUALITY: HA VE 
COMPUTERS CHANGED THE LABOR 
MARKET? 
The first dissertation chapter, joint with Lawrence F. 
Katz and Alan B. Krueger, examines the effect of skill-
biased technological change, as measured by 
computerization, on the recent widening of U.S. 
educational wage differentials. The first section of the 
essay presents evidence on trends in the relative 
quantities, wages, and wage bill shares of workers by 
education in the aggregate U.S. labor market from 1940 
to 1996. A simple relative supply-and-demand 
framework is used to interpret these data. Substantial 
secular relative demand growth favoring college 
workers over the past five decades is necessary to 
reconcile an increase of 0.25 in the log college/high 
school wage differential from 1950 to 1996 
(approximately 0.55 percent annually) with a more than 
threefold increase in the employment share of college 
graduates. The data are less clear on whether the trend 
rate of demand growth for more-educated workers has 
increased since the 1970s. Relative demand growth 
appears to have been more rapid than usual in the 
1980s, but its pace appears to have slowed considerably 
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, as is shown in section two 
of the essay, a substantial increase in the growth rate of 
the within-industry component of the relative demand 
for college workers is apparent from the 1960s to the 
1970s, and this higher within-industry growth rate is 
maintained into the 1980s and 1990s. 
The diffusion of computers and related technologies 
and changes in the organization of work associated with 
effectively utilizing these technologies may be 
sufficiently widespread to have contributed to this 
pattern of more rapid within-industry skill upgrading in 
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recent years. In section three of the essay, we use data 
from the October 1984, 1989, and 1993 Current 
Population Survey (CPS) supplements to document the 
growing utilization of computers in the workplace. We 
discuss the mechanisms through which changes in the 
costs of information technology may affect relative 
skill demands and find that educational upgrading 
occurred more rapidly in industries with greater 
computer utilization in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Finally, we explore the role of skill-biased 
technological change in the growth of the relative 
demand for more-skilled workers from 1960 to 1990 
by linking data from multiple sources on industry 
work-force composition, physical capital intensity, 
research and development expenditures, computer 
investments, and (for manufacturing industries) trade 
penetration and foreign outsourcing variables. We 
consistently find for both the manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing sectors that increases in the 
utilization of more-skilled workers are greater in the 
most computer-intensive industries. Indicators of 
employee computer usage, computer capital per 
worker, and the rate of computer investment are higher 
in industries with more rapid rates of skill upgrading in 
each of the last several decades, and in industries with 
larger accelerations in skill upgrading in the 1970s and 
1980s versus the 1960s. Using these measures of 
computerization in a regression framework, we are able 
to "account" for approximately 40 percent of the 
overall increase in U.S. within-industry skill upgrading 
from the 1960s to the 1970s and 35 percent of the 
increase in upgrading in manufacturing from the 1970s 
to the 1980s, although it is not clear that a causal 
interpretation is appropriate. Changes in import 
penetration and outsourcing in the manufacturing 
sector are not strong predictors of skill upgrading 
conditional on the computer investment ratio, but 
industries with expanding export shares appear to have 
faster growth in nonproduction worker payroll share. 
We conclude that skill-biased technological and 
organizational changes that accompanied the computer 
7 
revolution appear to have contributed to faster growth 
in relative skill demand within detailed industries 
starting in the 1970s. While the strong observed 
conditional correlations of our computer measures and 
the growth in the relative utilization of highly educated 
workers may not just reflect causal relationships, it 
seems clear that whatever is driving the rapid rate of 
within-industry skill upgrading over the past few 
decades, it is concentrated in the most computer-
intensive sectors ofthe U.S. economy. At the same 
time, these patterns leave much room for fluctuations in 
the rate of growth of the supply of college equivalents, 
globalization forces, and changes in labor market 
institutions to have contributed to recent movements in 
U.S. educational wage differentials. 
2. WHY DO lEMPORARY-HELP FIRMS 
PROVIDE FREE GENERAL SKILLS TRAINING? 
The second disseliation chapter explores a 
previously unstudied facet of recent computerization: 
the nominally free computer skills training provided by 
the majority of U.S. temporary help supply (THS) 
establishments. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), training in general, portable skills-
particularly computer skills-was available without 
charge or contractual requirement at approximately 75 
percent ofTHS establishments as of 1994, seemingly in 
defiance of the logic of the competitive model of 
training. The second essay investigates this puzzle to 
gain insight into the labor market role served by 
temporary-help firms and to explore employers' 
motivations for offering skills training more generally. 
The principal conclusion is that in addition to skills 
formation, skills training plays an informational 
function at THS firms by helping to elicit private 
knowledge that workers possess about ability. 
The conceptual model proposed in the essay is 
premised on the idea that training is more productive-
and hence valuable-to high-ability workers, where 
ability is defined as an individual's facility and/or 
motivation at learning job skills. Workers are assumed 
to have (imperfect) prior knowledge of their ability, 
while employers cannot initially perceive ability but 
observe it through training. Because of the learning 
advantage possessed by high-ability workers, firms are 
able to offer a package of training and initially lower 
wages that induces self-selection. Workers of high 
perceived ability choose to apply to firms offering 
training in expectation of wage gains in permanent 
employment, while low-ability workers are deterred by 
lower wages and limited expected gains. Firms profit 
from their training investment ex post via their ShOli-
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run informational advantage about ability and thereby 
limited monopsony power. 
Since the economic theory of training implicitly 
concerns how market forces impact training provision 
and payment, the model further explores how firms 
may adjust wages and training to accommodate 
competitive pressure as proxied by a "markup" 
parameter. Perhaps counter to the intuition of the 
standard framework, the model indicates that THS 
firms will choose to provide additional training to 
attract skilled workers as competitive conditions 
tighten. The explanation for this result is 
straightforward: due to their limited monopsony power, 
firms maximize profits by providing a level of training 
that is socially sub-optimal-equating marginal firm 
benefits with costs while ignoring gains accruing to 
workers. When heightened market competition 
requires firms to raise wages, they therefore find it 
optimal to provide additional efficient training that 
increases both wages and output. Since trainees earn 
less on average than non-trainees, the implication is 
that competition squeezes employer rents, narrowing 
the wedge between training and non-training wages. 
Tests of the model using a confidential BLS survey 
of wages and training in the THS industry find 
consistent support: wages are lower at establishments 
offering training by a modest but statistically significant 
magnitude; heightened market competition, as 
measured by a Herfindahl index, substantially increases 
finns' propensity to offer free training; and, although 
training grows with market competition, the wage gap 
between training and non-training firms contracts 
significantly. These findings are supplemented by an 
analysis of a national survey on hiring, training and 
placement at THS establishments conducted by the 
author. The survey results indicates that, consistent 
with the model, THS establishments offering free skills 
training are significantly more selective in their hiring 
criteria than non-training establishments, place a 
greater fraction of their workers in permanent positions, 
and primarily view training's role as one of attracting 
and screening motivated and capable workers. 
Based on these findings, the essay draws three 
conclusions. First, the research suggests that in 
addition to its conventional human capital role, training 
may usefully be viewed as a mechanism for eliciting 
private information about worker ability. In particular, 
in an environment in which ability and training are 
complementary and where workers hold initially 
superior information about their own ability, the 
analysis indicates that firms may employ training 
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strategically to differentially attract and retain more 
capable and motivated workers. 
Second, understanding the informational role played 
by training at THS firms may inform a question raised 
by many labor market analysts: what function do THS 
firms serve in the labor market and why are they 
growing so rapidly? A potential answer supplied by the 
present research is that in addition to providing labor 
services, THS firms gather and supply information 
about worker quality to the market. If the benefits to 
employers of making informed hiring decisions have 
increased recently, perhaps due to a changing legal 
environment surrounding worker dismissal (as 
discussed in the third dissertation chapter) or due to 
technological and organizational changes which more 
closely tie productivity to worker ability (as discussed 
in the first chapter), the growth of the THS industry as 
an information broker may be a partial result. 
A final noteworthy implication of the essay is that 
the growth of a "contingent" workforce may not imply 
a monotonic contraction of employer sponsored skills 
training. While an increase in THS employment (and 
other forms of arms-length contracting) may reduce 
employer's conventional incentives for human capital 
investment, the present model also suggests that high 
rates of worker turnover require employers to 
efficiently attract and screen employees, and that 
training may serve as the employment screen of choice 
in some contexts. Augmenting this trend, rapid 
technological change has likely increased the rate of 
skill obsolescence, thereby generating an incentive for 
workers to continually replenish skills to maintain 
marketability. Hence, paradoxically, training may 
become an increasingly effective screening tool even as 
its "shelf life" diminishes. 
These observations are not to suggest, however, that 
the growth of the "contingent" workforce augurs an 
overall intensification of skill training efforts. As the 
THS example shows, training may be simultaneously 
prevalent and of limited depth. The principal argument 
is rather that, because training may serve an 
informational as well as human capital function, firms' 
motivation and propensity for offering skills training 
may differ substantially from the conventional 
understanding. While training's primary function may 
always be to augment worker productivity, its 
hypothesized role in selectively attracting and 
screening applicants may become increasingly 
significant. 
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3. OUTSOURCING AT WILL: UNJUST 
DISMISSAL DOCTRINE AND THE GROWTH 
OF TEMPORARY-HELP EMPLOYMENT 
Building on the view that temporary-help firms 
may serve a screening function for permanent 
employment, this chapter explores a potential cause of 
the apparent increase in employer demand for 
screening and arms-length contracting: the erosion of 
the common-law doctrine of employment at will. Until 
the late 1960s, U.S. common-law employment doctrine 
held, with few exceptions, that unless explicitly 
contracted otherwise, employers and employees 
possessed unlimited discretion to terminate their 
employment relationships at any time and for any 
reason without legal consequence. Between 1973 and 
1995, however, courts in 46 states adopted exceptions 
to the employment at will doctrine, thereby limiting 
employers' discretion to terminate workers and opening 
them to potentially costly litigation. DUling the same 
period, temporary-help employment grew at the 
unprecedented rate of approximately 11 percent 
annually. The goal of this chapter is to assess whether 
the contemporaneous growth of temporary-help supply 
and the rapid decline of employment at will are 
causally related. 
Section 1 of this essay provides a legal history of the 
adoption and erosion of the at-will doctrine, discusses 
the three categories of exception to the doctrine 
recognized by the courts, and considers their 
implications for temporary-help supply. Because THS 
firms are bound by the same legal restrictions as other 
employers, it is not obvious a priori that the erosion of 
employment at will should advantage THS. In 
particular, the essay argues that two of the doctrinal 
exceptions, the public policy and implied covenant 
exceptions, are unlikely to have had significant impacts 
on THS. A third exception, however, the implied 
contractual light to continued employment ("implied 
contract" exception) appears highly relevant to THS. 
Unlike the public policy and implied covenant 
doctrines, which primarily limit terminations that 
violate ethical or public policy norms, the implied 
contract doctrine bars terminations where employers 
may have by action, policy, or industry practice implied 
that they would only terminate employees for valid 
cause, i.e., poor pelformance or economic necessity. 
By providing numerous employees with a legal right to 
ongoing employment (frequently in cases where the 
contract was neither originally intended by the 
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employer nor expected by the worker), the implied 
contract exception creates significant costs and legal 
uncertainty for many employers-but notably not for 
THS employers. Because THS employment is by 
nature temporary, courts are quite unlikely to recognize 
an implied contract action by a THS worker. Hence, 
the analysis suggests that the widespread adoption of 
the implied contract doctrine might plausibly have 
contributed to the rapid growth of THS. 
To formalize these ideas, section 2 develops an 
illustrative model of the impact of firing costs on firms' 
hiring, screening, and outsourcing decisions. The 
model is predicated on three ideas. First, although the 
legal environment may make it costly for employers to 
terminate workers who are hired directly, employers 
may contract for workers terminable at will through a 
THS supplier that charges a "markup" for its services. 
Second, firms face ex ante uncertainty about worker 
productivity or "fit" that may be partly resolved through 
a period of trial employment. Third, workers have an 
option to make productive up-front investments in firm-
specific capital. but the value of this capital is destroyed 
when workers are terminated. 
The model suggests that there exists a trade-off 
between reducing termination costs via THS 
contracting (outsourcing) and motivating workers to 
make productive specific capital investments, i.e., 
"taking a personal stake in the company." How firms 
resolve this trade-off for a given job depends not only 
on the extent of firing costs but also on the value of 
specific capital investment foregone by outsourcing. 
Greater firing costs lead to increased temporary-help 
employment, both on the extensive margin (greater 
occupational scope) and on the intensive margin 
(greater "depth" within an occupation). Occupations 
that were previously hired directly shift towards THS 
contracting, while those already contracted through 
THS experience fewer temporary-to-permanent 
conversions. The relative size of THS grows. 
Moreover, because firing costs are likely highest in 
occupations where specific capital is most important to 
productivity, it is plausible that workers with relatively 
lower firing costs will be predominantly employed 
through THS. This implication consistent with the 
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observation that the bulk of occupations contracted 
through THS entail relatively low expected firing costs 
but also demand predominantly general skills (e.g., 
clerical, assembly, and laborer positions). 
To explore these relationships empirically, the 
analysis exploits variation in the timing of state comt 
decisions recognizing the three employment at-will 
exceptions to ascertain whether THS employment grew 
disproportionately in states and times after these 
exceptions were adopted. Consistent with the legal 
analysis, the data reveal a sizable and robust 
relationship between adoption of the implied contract 
exception and growth of THS employment. I estimate 
that in the one- to five-year period after a state's 
adoption of the implied contract exception, THS 
employment grew on average by 20 percent relative to 
trend with no evidence of mean reversion in subsequent 
years. By contrast, the public policy and implied 
covenant exceptions are not found to have an impact on 
THS employment. The findings are robust to numerous 
specification checks and the inclusion of a broad set of 
covariates. In total, the estimates indicate that due to 
court restrictions limiting unjust dismissal, 
approximately 291,000 to 399,000 additional workers 
were employed in THS on an average daily basis as of 
1998. The essay further considers factors that may 
cause the empirical analysis to underestimate the total 
impact of the changing legal doctrine on THS growth. 
Yet, while changes to the at-will doctrine appear to 
have significantly impacted the THS industry, the 
conclusion emphasizes that the present research does 
not constitute a welfare evaluation of the changing legal 
doctrine. Because THS is only one margin of labor 
market response, it remains plausible that the 
compensatory benefits to workers of amending the 
doctrine-increased employment security and greater 
freedom from retaliatory discharge-outweigh this 
potential source of harm. Bearing these qualifications 
in mind, the essay provides insight into an institutional 
force contributing to the rapidly evolving U.S. 
employment relationship and offers the first empirical 
evidence supporting an explanation for the growth of 
THS employment: the erosion of employment at will. 
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